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What is madness?, by Darian Leader, London, Hamish Hamilton, 2011, 359 pp., 
(hardcover), ISBN 978-0-241-14488-6 
Darian Leader’s early books were intellectually stimulating jaunts through 
literature, art, and, of course, Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis. The more 
recent titles, including The new black (2008) and What is madness? retain 
much of the accessibility of the previous books. What sets them apart however 
is the refined focus on clinical issues, and, particularly in What is madness?, an 
abiding concern with the practicalities of psychoanalytic treatment. What 
makes this priority all the more notable is that it is often lamentably absent in 
Lacanian texts on psychosis. Books of this sort characteristically veer off into 
abstruse theoretical excursions, evincing a greater interest in Lacan’s 
intellectual productions than the words and experiences of patients 
themselves. This is patently not the case here; Leader’s attentiveness to the 
particular difficulties, life history and speech of his patents is evident 
throughout. Importantly also, although Leader would doubtlessly situate 
himself as a Lacanian, the conceptual antecedents to the clinical approach 
advanced are not Lacanian alone. There is, characteristically, a good deal of 
Freud, and, in addition, an impressive knowledge of a spectrum of early 
psychoanalytic authors on display. More interestingly yet, given the apparent 
absence of such literature in much of contemporary British psychoanalysis, is 
the frequent reference to ‘old school’ (early 20th Century) French psychiatry, a 
rich tradition of clinical thought that Leader treats of vital importance in 
conceptualizing psychosis. 
 Two important claims are made from the outset. Firstly, that we need to 
take ‘quiet madness’ seriously, i.e. that the absence of noisy symptoms does 
not mean that psychotic structure is not present. A great deal of contemporary 
Lacanian thought has busied itself with questions of ‘untriggered’ or ‘ordinary’ 
psychosis that is not immediately evident, and not diagnosable on the basis of 
overt behavioural traits. Hence Leader’s distinction: “people can be mad 
without going mad” (p. 11).   This means that madness and normality are not 
necessarily opposed; more frequently than not, madness and normality are 
commensurate with one another, thoroughly assimilated. The upshot for 
clinical diagnosis is clear: “madness is never reducible to external, attention-
grabbing symptoms” (p. 34). Far more important for diagnosis than attention 
to symptoms is careful consideration of underlying clinical structure. This is a 
refrain throughout Leader’s text: it is not the presence of given symptoms that 
matters – non-psychotic subjects can experience ostensibly psychotic 
symptoms – but what the subject makes of these symptoms, how they relate 
to them. 
 How then to distinguish neurotic from psychotic structure?  A first basic 
distinction proves helpful in this regard, between repression and foreclosure, 
the two primary mechanisms qualifying neurosis and psychosis respectively. 
Whereas repression takes place upon material that has already been 
symbolized and structured, the  
more extreme mechanism of foreclosure doesn’t admit the first 
stage of integration. The rejected element has never been admitted 
into the person’s mental universe, as if there were no possibility of 
symbolization. It is like an unassimilable signification, something that 
cannot be thought…a blank spot in the person’s thought processes 
(p. 41). 
It is for this reason that the neurotic’s slip of the tongue and the psychotic’s 
hallucination can be contrasted: “When the neurotic makes a slip, they feel 
embarrassed…they recognize that the slip comes from them. But in the 
psychotic hallucination, the disturbing element comes from outside: it’s not us, 
it’s the Other” (pp. 40-41). What follows on from this – a fact of Lacanian 
practice not often appreciated - is that a radically different treatment regime 
must be pursued in the case of psychotics. Given that the unconscious is 
effectively ‘in realty itself’, not subject to the various mechanisms of 
repression, then a whole variety of clinical procedures designed to elicit or 
interpret the unconscious become inappropriate in the psychoanalytic 
treatment of psychosis.  
 The key theoretical concept that needs to be mobilized in the case of 
identifying psychotic structure, at least from a Lacanian perspective, is the 
notion of the Name-of-the-Father. This initially intimidating construct is 
explained in exemplary clarity by Leader via a re-telling of the Oedipus 
complex. Language, as always, is crucial in Lacanian conceptualization, and it is 
the role of language and symbolic processes as psychically structuring forces 
that must be grasped here. “Through language” Leader explains, “the symbolic 
enters the real of our bodies and organizes them for us” (p. 52). This is how 
symbolic law comes to be inscribed within us. “Lacan thought that the 
symbolic order contained a privileged representative of this principle, what he 
called the Name-of-the-Father” (p. 52). The child is thus ushered into the world 
of laws, prohibitions, symbolic roles and language, delivered thus from the 
dyadic relationship with the mother that is characterized by a continual 
preoccupation with her desire. Lacan dubbed this process the paternal 
metaphor, which is glossed by Leader: “the father is substituted for the 
aspiration to complete the mother, who now takes up her place at the 
vanishing point of unconscious desire” (p. 62).  
The phallus is the term Lacan gives to the child’s ongoing conjectures as 
to what the mother wants or lacks. The phallus then, as  hypothesis of the 
mother’s lack, typically (but not necessarily) coalesces around the figure of the 
father. There is nothing essential about the father which would privilege him as 
owner of the phallus; rather it is the case that this figure often occupies some 
position within the locus of the mother’s focus or interest beyond the child. 
The phallus, furthermore, is “an index of the impossibility of completion or 
fulfilment”, and it assumes the “value of loss, what we cannot be and cannot 
have in the present” (p. 61). One should note also, a point anticipated above, 
that the substitution of symbolic law for the mother’s desire as fulcrum of 
unconscious life has profound effects on the level of sexuality. The sexual 
energy that Freud termed ‘libido’ is domesticated, given a focus, and 
excitations of the body are thus restructured.   
In summation then, the Oedipus complex achieves three key operations 
in non-psychotic subjects. Firstly, “it introduces meaning, by tying the question 
of the mother’s desire to an answer: the father and the phallus” (p. 66). 
Secondly, it localizes libido, determining “the strength of our sexual 
attachments and interests, making…the prohibited image of the mother…the 
horizon of sexual desire” (p. 66). Thirdly, it situates us relative to what Lacan 
refers to as the Other, that is, the set of social and symbolic values set in play 
by language, the trans-subjective social substance, particularized in different 
ways for different subjects. It becomes clear why Leader devotes this much 
time to discussing these facets of the Name-of-the-Father. A failure in any of 
these crucial operations - the attribution of stable meaning to reality, the 
anchoring of the libido, the ability to maintain a safe distance from the Other – 
is indicative of psychosis. More than just that, “these problems will allow us 
not only to distinguish different kinds of psychosis, but also…[to] show us how 
other forms of…construction can help the individual create a less invasive, 
more bearable world” (p.66). 
The three chief sub-categories of psychosis that Leader names are 
paranoia, schizophrenia and melancholia. In paranoia, libido is located outside, 
typically in some persecutory subject or institution with malign intents, or in 
some fault or problem in the world that needs be rectified. Affirming the 
Lacanian prioritization of certainty as a general indicator of psychosis, Leader 
reiterates the Freudian lesson: “The paranoia lies less in the idea itself than in 
the certainty and the rigidity with which it is held” (p. 77). Paranoia, 
furthermore, involves the generation of knowledge, “a belief system centred 
around a fault or persecutor, which has a high yield of explanatory power” (p. 
77). A useful distinction between melancholia and paranoia concerns the 
relation to the Other: for paranoiacs, the problem is always the fault of others 
(the government, the neighbour, etc.); in melancholia it is always the subject 
themselves who is to blame. Leader has offered a developed account of 
melancholia elsewhere (2008), but nonetheless includes further comments 
that prove helpful in the case of differential diagnosis. In contrast to neurotic 
doubt, the melancholic is absolutely certain of their worthlessness – “It is as if 
the melancholic subject harbours a primary ontological fault within 
themselves” (p. 91). 
Particularly helpful is Leader’s characterization of schizophrenia. 
Schizophrenic psychosis often becomes apparent by virtue of the instability of 
meaning for the patient, and, as importantly,  by the lack of a coherent or 
unified body image. In contrasting neurosis and psychosis, Leader speaks of 
how the libido is linked to a minus sign in neurosis - where there is often a 
prevailing sense of a lost or compromised enjoyment - and a plus sign in 
psychosis, where the libido is experienced as excessive, an invasive force. The 
diagnostic priority that follows is an acute attentiveness to how subjects 
describe their bodily experience, or, more to the point, how they speak about 
the limits and/or wholeness of the body image. Likewise important is any 
indication of the sliding of meaning, often evinced in ‘schizophrenic speech’ 
(whereby words are joined by sound rather than meaning), polysemy (multiple 
meanings attributed to a single signifier), or the failure of metaphor (instances 
of literalization evident that the subject struggles with figurative modes of 
language).  
In a passage describing the importance of what he terms ‘the naming 
function’, Leader offers an example of the threefold diagnostic distinction 
discussed above: 
Where, in neurosis, the Oedipus complex succeeds in naming the 
desire of the mother…in the psychoses the subject has to invent: for 
the paranoiac, in naming what is wrong with the world; for the 
melancholic, in naming what is wrong with themselves; and for the 
schizophrenic, as a  perpetual and unresolved activity (p. 87). 
The book’s penultimate chapter identifies a series of clinical strategies for 
working with psychosis. The imperative of restructuring the patient’s world is a 
primary aim, and Leader describes how a type of external structure may help 
compensate for an internal system that was never adequately established. 
There are different ways that such a structure might become operative. Clearly 
designated roles, tasks or rule systems can be of help in forming a prosthetic 
symbolic order. Also of significant value are practices which help name and 
limit the libido; that enable the naming and ‘objectifying’ of symptoms and 
hence a pinning down of meaning; forms of identification that designate a 
stable position, a location-point; and what Leader refers to as “the modulation 
of the addressee function” (p. 310), that is, the passing on to others of invasive 
messages or punishing thoughts. The factor of invention is particularly 
emphasized. If in psychosis we find a particular difficulty with the 
symbolization of the beginnings and ends of things – an intriguing notion 
Leader borrows from Arthur Burton – if, furthermore pre-existing grids of 
meaning continual fail, then “the psychotic subject must reinvent” (p. 322). 
Hence the importance of encouraging and facilitating such acts of production, 
be it writing, drawing, painting “or any human practice of inscription” (p. 322). 
 One criticism of Leader’s style concerns his use of examples. True 
enough, the impressive case studies assembled here - including that of Freud’s 
famous ‘Wolf man’, and the mass murderer Harold Shipman – provide the 
backbone of the book and usefully exemplify many of the theoretical points 
introduced earlier on. That being said, there are moments when an isolated 
example – a patient’s repeated use of the word ‘Wassup?’ from a Jay-Z song, 
for instance, or the invention of an imaginary machine of torture by an inmate 
of Bedlam in 1797 – beg further description, and a somewhat less elliptical 
treatment.  The text also lacks an index, a significant oversight for a volume 
that can well serve as a useful reference-book for clinicians. These issues being 
noted, there is no denying that Leader has produced a rare combination: an 
essential sourcebook for the treatment of psychosis which is also a fascinating 
introduction, suitable for the lay reader, to the domain of Lacanian thought. 
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